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  • DEDICATION
  • TITLE 1
  • TITLE 2
  • DECLARATION
  • CERTIFICATE
  • ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
  • CONTENTS
  • LIST OF FIGURES
  • LIST OF TABLES
  • Preface
  • 1. Legalisation of International Economic Relations
  • 1.1 The World Trade Organisation: Victory for Legalists
  • 1.2 DSB Rulings as International Legal Obligation
  • 1.3 Legalisation and Sovereignty
  • 2. The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism
  • 2.1 The International Trade Organisation (ITO)
  • 2.1.1 The International Trade Organisation: Its Structure and Functions
  • 2.1.2 Dispute Settlement under ITO
  • 2.2 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)
  • 2.2.1 Dispute Settlement Procedures
  • 2.2.2 Development of Panel System
  • 2.2.3 Dispute Adjudication by GATT: How the Panel works
  • 2.2.4 GATT Dispute Settlement System: Analytical History
  • 2.1 Pre-WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures
  • 2.2.5 Defects of GATT
  • 3. WTOS Dispute Settlement Machanism: The Constitutional Framework
  • 3.1 GATT and WTO: Major Differences
  • 3.1.1. Unifled Package of Agreements
  • 3.1.2.Expansion of GATT
  • 3.1.3. Expansion of Membership
  • 3.2 Organisational Structure of WTO
  • 3.1 Membership in GATT during different rounds
  • 3.2.1 Organisational Structure
  • 3.1 The World Trade Organisational Tree
  • 3.2.2 Decision by Voting
  • 3.3 WTOs Dispute Settlement Mechanism
  • 3.2 Decision-Making in the WTO
  • 3.3.1 General Provisions
  • 3.3.2 Consultations
  • 3.3.3 Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation
  • 3.3.4 Establishment of Panels
  • 3.3.5 The Panel Process
  • 3.3.6 Adoption of the report
  • 3.3.7 Appellate Review
  • 3.3.8 Time frame for DSB decisions
  • 3.3.9 Surveillance of implementation of recommendations and rulings
  • 3.3.10 Retaliation
  • 3.3 Agreements and sectors for Retaliation purposes
  • 3.3.11 Arbitration
  • 3.3.12 Non-Violation Nullification and Impairment Complaints
  • 3.3.13 Responsibilities of the Secretariat
  • 3.3.17 Implementation
  • 3.4 Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM)
  • 3.5 Major Constitutional Issues
  • 3.5.1 Stare Decisis in WTO Law: A Myth
  • 3.5.2 Ambiguity of Non-Violation Cases
  • 3.6 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of GATT and WTO: A Comparative Analysis
  • 3.6.1 A Unified vs. Multiple Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
  • 3.6.2 Prescribed Time Limits for dispute adjudication
  • 3.6.3 Existence of an Appellate Body
  • 3.3 WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures and Deadline
  • 3.2 WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure
  • 3.6.4 Effective Enforcement Measures
  • 4. WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Performance (1995-1999)
  • 4.1 Overview of Disputes (as of 1 January 2000)
  • 4.1 Status of disputes
  • 4.2 Major Players involved in the WTO Disputes
  • 4.2.1 Developed Countries, developing countries and least developed countries
  • 4.2.2 Top Five litigants
  • 4.1 Top Five Participants in the Dispute Settlement System
  • 4.2 Top Five Litigants among the Developing Countries
  • 4.3 Participation of developed countries / developing countries/ least developing countries in WTO dispute settlement system
  • 4.2.3 WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the Developing Countries
  • 4.3 Performance of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The First Five Years
  • 4.3.1 Consultations
  • 4.3.2 The Panel System: First Five Years
  • 4.2 Number of Requests for Consultations (1995-1999)
  • 4.4 Number of Requests for Consultations (1995-1999)
  • 4.3.3 The Appellate Body
  • 5. Dispute Adjudication in TRIPS (1995-1999)
  • 5.1 The TRIPS Agreement
  • 5.2 The TRIPS Disputes
  • 5.1 The TRIPS Cases (1995-1999)
  • 5.2.1 Mutually Agreed Solutions
  • 5.2.2 Inactive cases
  • 5.2.3 Disputes that reached PaneVAppellate Body Stage
  • 5.3 Conclusion
  • 6. Enforcement of DSBs Rulings: A Case Study
  • 6.1 Indian Legal System
  • 6.2 TRIPS as a tool of retaliation
  • 6.3 Conclusion
  • CONCLUSION
  • Selected Bibliography
  • APPENDIX